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Abstract 
Testimonial Inconsistencies, Adverse Credibility Determinations, and Asylum 
Adjudication in the United States 
Sarah Filone, M.A. 
David DeMatteo, JD, PhD 
 
 
Political asylum is a judicial process by which an individual facing persecution in his or 
her home country may be granted residence and protection within a foreign country. In 
the United States, immigration judges render credibility determinations that are often 
considered one of the most influential components of an asylum claim. Even small 
testimonial inconsistencies can be cited as the basis for an adverse credibility 
determination and subsequent asylum claim denial; however, to date no research has 
compared the levels/types of discrepancies in veracious accounts to those in fabricated claims. 
The present study aimed to add to the literature by determining what, if any, differences 
in testimonial inconsistencies existed between genuine and exaggerated asylum claims. 
Twenty-eight individuals who have been legally granted asylum in the United States were 
randomized to either a “genuine” or “exaggerated” claim condition and interviewed at 
two time points. The content of the interviews was coded for discrepancies, and 
discrepancy levels were compared between groups. No significant differences between 
groups were found, and discrepancy levels across participants were unexpectedly high. 
Results suggest that the current practice of using testimonial inconsistencies as a proxy 
for the detection of exaggerated or false asylum claims may be misguided.
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Testimonial Inconsistencies, Adverse Credibility Determinations, and Asylum 
Adjudication  
in the United States 
Political asylum is a judicial process by which an individual facing persecution in 
his or her home country may be granted residence and protection within a foreign 
country. To be eligible for asylum in the United States, an applicant must meet the 
definition of refugee set forth in Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA; 1952). The United States’ definition of refugee allows status to be granted 
based on either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, so long as 
the persecution occurs on account of religion, race, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion. The term “persecution” has not been 
uniformly defined by the courts, but has been characterized by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit as “punishment or the infliction of harm for political, 
religious, or other reasons that this country does not recognize as legitimate” (Mitev v. 
INS, 1995, p. 1330). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit further 
describes persecution as an experience that “must rise above unpleasantness, harassment 
and even basic suffering” (Nelson v. INS, 2000, p. 20)  
Asylum Process 
In the United States, asylum adjudication is generally determined in one of two 
ways. The first process by which applicants can be granted (or denied) asylum is the 
“affirmative” asylum process. Affirmative asylum applications involve voluntary 
identification to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) via a formal asylum 
application filing. An interview with an asylum officer will then be conducted and an 
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initial determination will be rendered. If the case is considered eligible for asylum during 
this interview, the applicant will be granted asylum and issued necessary legal documents 
(e.g., a green card). If the case cannot be officially determined during this initial phase, it 
will be referred to the immigration court and a judge will make the final decision 
regarding the applicant’s status. Cases that are referred to immigration court after an 
affirmative asylum filing are considered to be “defensive” asylum claims. Defensive 
asylum applications also include individuals who have been detained by DHS as a result 
of illegal residence in the United States and removal proceedings (formerly known as 
“deportation proceedings”) have been initiated. Defensive cases are decided by 
immigration judges through the Department of Justice (United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services: Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate 
Asylum Division, 2010). For a visual representation of the flow of affirmative asylum 
applications from 2000-2004 and defensive applications from 2001-2005, see Figures 1 
and 2 (figures courtesy of Transitional Records Access Clearinghouse, 2006).  
Figure 1.      Figure 2.   
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 Thousands of displaced persons apply for asylum in the United States each year. 
In 2012, 58,179 individuals entered the United States as refugees (Office of Immigration 
Statistics, 2013). Of those, 29,484 individuals were granted asylum, including 17,506 
individuals who were granted asylum affirmatively by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and 11,978 individuals who were granted asylum defensively by the 
Department of Justice (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2013). Asylum grant rates have 
varied considerably over the past several decades, with a record high average national 
grant rate of 55.5% in 2012. This is substantially higher than the 37.4% national average 
grant rate in 2002, and the 24.0% national average grant rate in 1992 (Transitional 
Records Access Clearinghouse: Immigration, 2013). 
Inequalities in Asylum Adjudication 
 Some of the most troubling asylum adjudication statistics are those concerning 
vast disparities in asylum denial rates among immigration judges. In 2006, the 
Transitional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) conducted a comprehensive review 
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s asylum adjudication data collected 
between the years of 1994 and 2005. This study revealed large disparities in asylum 
denial rates among judges, with rates ranging from 10% - 98% among the 208 active 
immigration judges. This range included eight judges who denied 90% of the asylum 
claims in their courtrooms and two judges who granted 90% of their cases (Transitional 
Records Access Clearinghouse: Immigration, 2006). A follow-up study in 2007 
concluded that “the identity of the judge who handles a particular matter often is more 
important than the underlying facts” (Transitional Records Access Clearinghouse: 
Immigration, 2007, p. 1).  
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 Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag (2008) conducted an extensive 
examination of asylum decisions from all four levels of the adjudication process 
including data from 133,000 decisions rendered by asylum officers, 140,000 decisions of 
immigration judges, 126,000 decisions rendered by the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
and 4,215 decisions of the United States courts of appeals. Results indicated vast 
disparities among grant rates, even for individuals of the same country of origin within 
the same jurisdiction. For example, Ramji-Nogales et al. found that Colombian asylum 
applicants whose cases were decided in the federal immigration court in Miami had a 5% 
chance of being granted asylum by one of that court's judges and an 88% chance of 
succeeding before another judge in the same courthouse. The paper also examined 
asylum outcomes based on immigration judge characteristics and other factors of the 
case. They found that grant rates were strongly associated with several factors, including 
assignment to a specific judge, gender of the assigned judge, prior work experiences of 
the judge, and the presence of legal representation. Legal representation appeared to be 
the single most important factor, with individuals with legal counsel almost three times 
more likely to prevail in their cases (45.6% grant rate) than those without legal 
representation (16.3% grant rate). Female judges also granted asylum in a higher 
proportion of cases than their male counterparts. 
 The data presented in this section reveal troubling levels of inconsistency within 
the asylum adjudication process. In part, these inconsistencies may be due to the lack of 
well-defined guidelines by which immigration judges can make decisions. One of the 
most ill-defined aspects of the asylum decision process involves assessments of applicant 
credibility. 
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Credibility Assessment in the Context of Asylum Adjudication   
 Although not an explicit part of the asylum adjudication process, the credibility 
(i.e., trustworthiness) of an applicant is often considered one of the most influential 
components of an asylum claim, and an adverse credibility determination can be the basis 
for an asylum claim’s denial (Cohen, 2001; Kagan, 2003; McKinnon, 2009). Kagan’s 
(2003) review of the United Nations Refugee Agency’s largest office (UNHCR Cairo) 
revealed that 77% of all rejected asylum claims during the sampling period (880/1144 
total rejections) were denied on the basis of “lack of credibility.”  Adverse credibility 
findings were explicitly cited in 48% of the denied asylum rulings in Anker’s (1991) 
study of 42 United States immigration judge decisions, and McKinnon’s (2009) review of 
100 appellate level cases found that 40% of the unsuccessful claims referenced an 
adverse credibility finding. Credibility determinations can be based on numerous factors, 
but prior to 2005 testimonial inconsistencies that were not relevant to the central facts of 
the asylum application could not be used to support an adverse credibility finding and 
subsequent claim denial (Eyster, 2012). However, the REAL ID Act of 2005 expanded 
the rules of credibility determination to allow inconsistent testimony regarding peripheral 
details (e.g., dates, non-central aspects of the claim) to sustain adverse credibility findings 
(Eyster, 2012). The Act also allows immigration judges to rely heavily on the claimants’ 
credibility, rather than the content of the cases in rendering their decisions (McKinnon, 
2009). Specifically, the Act defines the basis of credibility determinations in the 
following manner: 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a 
trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, 
or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of 
the applicant's or witness's account, the consistency between the 
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applicant's or witness's written and oral statements (whenever made and 
whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which 
the statements were made), the internal consistency of each such 
statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of 
record (including the reports of the Department of State on country 
conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, 
without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes 
to the heart of the applicant's claim, or any other relevant factor. There is 
no presumption of credibility, however, if no adverse credibility 
determination is explicitly made, the applicant or witness shall have a 
rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal. (INA § 208(b)(3)(B)(iii) 
(2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
 
In other words, an applicant’s behavior, believability, and consistency can be used to 
support an adverse credibility finding – even if these factors are not directly relevant to 
the key aspects of the asylum claim. It is perhaps not surprising that credibility is 
afforded so much weight in asylum proceedings, given that these cases often lack the 
level of evidentiary support judges may rely on in other types of proceedings. For 
example, it is often difficult for displaced persons to provide corroborating evidence (e.g., 
police reports, medical records) to substantiate their claims, so the veracity of their 
testimony often becomes the primary means by which the case must be determined 
(Herlihy, Scragg, & Turner, 2002; Kagan, 2003).  
It should be noted that concerns about erroneous asylum claims are not 
unfounded. Several cases of fraudulent asylum schemes have drawn national attention, 
such as the case of Regina Norman Danson, a Ghanaian woman who was granted asylum 
based on her alleged fears regarding genital mutilation in her home country. Her case was 
publicly supported by several celebrities and political figures, but she was later charged 
with lying under oath and entering the United States with a fraudulent passport when 
investigators discovered that the central facts of her claim had been fabricated 
(Glaberson, 2002). Organized for-profit organizations providing illegal immigrants with 
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fraudulent documents and asylum process “coaching” have also been uncovered in 
several major cities. For example, one Philadelphia-based organization was prosecuted 
for filing at least 380 counterfeit asylum applications for clients between 2003 and 2007, 
and a former New York City immigration lawyer was sentenced to 5 years in prison after 
helping an undercover FBI agent design a fake asylum claim (Dolnick, 2011; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2010). 
Despite these concerns, the ways in which credibility assessments are used to 
determine the legal status of an applicant are often inconsistent, unguided by empirical 
evidence, and problematic. For example, testimonial inconsistencies are often used to 
support adverse credibility claims, even though inconsistencies may be due to a variety of 
factors other than deliberate deception. Anker (1991) describes numerous cases in which 
inadequate or incorrect interpretation led to erroneous adverse credibility determinations. 
For example, one interpreter mis-identified the murdered relative of an Ethiopian asylum 
applicant as her uncle during initial testimony. Later, the story was correctly interpreted 
and it was conveyed that the applicant’s grandfather (not her uncle) had been murdered in 
Ethiopa. The judge, in rendering his adverse credibility finding, cited that (among other 
things) the applicant first reported her uncle had been killed and then later stated it was 
her grandfather.  
McKinnon (2009) reports several such cases as well, including one case in which 
the presiding judge misheard the applicant’s testimony that an “Iranian nun” had 
provided her with application assistance as an “Iranian man” had helped her. When she 
later gave the female name of the nun who had aided her with her application, the judge 
determined this aspect of the story to be inconsistent with prior testimony and determined 
8 
 
 
 
her to be non-credible, in part due to the fact that the ‘‘Court believes this [Fatima 
Brown] is a female name, not a male name’’ (McKinnon, 2009, p. 211).  
Even when interpretation errors are not present, small or justifiable 
inconsistencies are sometimes cited as the basis for adverse credibility findings. In one 
unpublished case (Xunsheng Li v. Mukasey, 2008), the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit upheld an adverse credibility determination based on the applicant’s 
failure to report his wife’s involuntary abortion and sterilization in his original asylum 
application. The court determined that the immigration judge gave “specific and cogent” 
reasons for disbelieving the applicant’s explanation that he did not know about the 
sterilization procedures because his wife withheld the information to keep him from 
worrying (Xunsheng Li v. Mukasey, 2008). The following excerpt was taken from another 
applicant’s claim rejection letter in the United Kingdom: “You then stated that you 
remained at a friend’s house until 30 October, 1995, when your parents telephoned to let 
you know that sentence had been passed on Ken Saro-Wiwa. [The Secretary of State] is 
aware that sentence was passed on Ken Saro-Wiwa ... on 31 October, 1995. [He] is of the 
opinion that these discrepancies must cast doubt on the credibility of your claim” 
(Herlihy & Turner, 2009, p. 5). Many cases in which individuals present a slightly 
different version of the facts (e.g., first stating an even occurred in June, but later 
reporting July), or include additional information (two incidents of rape instead of one) in 
later interviews have been considered to lack credibility (Cohen, 2009).  
Memory and Adverse Credibility Determinations 
Adverse credibility findings based on testimonial inconsistencies are especially 
concerning given what we know about human memory and retrieval. The extensive 
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literature on eyewitness memory clearly delineates the inaccuracy, plasticity, and 
potential bias of human memory, particularly under stressful circumstances (Christianson 
& Safer, 1996; Deffenbacher, Penrod, Bornstein, & McGorty, 2004). One important 
finding within this literature is that memory for peripheral details of an event (e.g., the 
clothing an individual was wearing) is often far less accurate than recollections of central 
details (e.g., whether the individual had a gun) (Christianson & Safer, 1996). Some 
peripheral details of past events have been shown to be especially difficult to recall, such 
as dates and times (McIntyre & Craik, 1987); however, such inconsistencies can currently 
be cited as the basis for an adverse credibility determination. 
Research has also consistently supported the phenomenon of hypermnesia – the 
ability to recall more information with repeated attempts (see Bluck, Levine, & Laulhere, 
1999, for a review). This phenomenon has been demonstrated within the context of 
autobiographical and traumatic event memory, as in Katz and Hershkowitz’s (2012) 
study which found that conducting second interviews with children who had experienced 
sexual abuse yielded 58% more “forensically relevant” information than a single 
interview. Bluck et al. (1999) found that individuals were able to recall more information 
regarding an autobiographical event (their personal experience of the O.J. Simpson 
verdict) over repeated sessions, even after stating they could recall nothing further. In 
addition, the number of autobiographical errors increased with each retelling of the event, 
but the ratio of false to real information remained the same indicating that with each 
retelling of an autobiographical event, an individual is likely to recall more correct and 
more incorrect information. Bluck et al. (1999) also reported a tendency for participants 
to forget or omit certain details during the course of repeated interviews. Hypermnesia is 
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particularly relevant in the context of asylum interviews, as applicants are typically asked 
to recount their stories multiple times, often with large intervals of time between 
accounts. Given the research on hypermnesia, it is not surprising that later accounts might 
contain more detail, and perhaps omissions of earlier reported facts. However, such errors 
are often used to support adverse credibility determinations and the denial of an asylum 
claim. 
As Cohen (2009) outlines, there are also several conditions specific to asylum 
applicants that may impact the ability to produce consistent statements. Individuals 
fleeing persecution have often been exposed to severe trauma that can contribute to 
various physical and mental challenges affecting memory, including malnutrition, 
depression, sleep difficulties, posttraumatic stress symptoms, and traumatic brain injuries. 
Prolonged malnourishment has been shown to negatively impact memory functioning 
(Sutker, Winstead, Galina, & Allain, 1991). Traumatic brain injury, even when very 
minor, can also influence memory recall (Voller et al., 1999), as can sleep deprivation 
(Idzikowski, 1984), depression (Pelosi, Slade, Blumhardt, & Sharma, 2000), and 
posttraumatic stress disorder (Brewin, Kleiner, Vasterling, & Field, 2007; Yehuda et al., 
1995).  
Multicultural considerations can also impact the quality and consistency of 
testimony. Jobson (2009) conducted an autobiographical memory study with individuals 
from individualist and interdependent (i.e., collectivist) cultures and found that 
participants from individualist cultures consistently provided more detailed 
autobiographical accounts than those originating from a collectivist culture. In addition, 
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language barriers and cultural norms (e.g., refraining from speaking about sexual 
violence) may impact the perceived credibility of an applicant (McKinnon, 2009) 
To date, there appears to be only one empirical study looking specifically at the 
issue of testimonial inconsistencies and adverse credibility determinations. Herlihy et al. 
(2002) conducted dual interviews with 43 individuals who had been granted asylum 
affirmatively in the United Kingdom (interval between interviews ranged from 2 to 32 
weeks). Participants were asked to describe the same traumatic and non-traumatic event 
at each interview, which was guided by a semi-structured interview tool consisting of 15 
questions. After each question, participants were asked to rate the detail as either central 
or peripheral to the event. The interviews were coded for discrepancies, and discrepancy 
levels were calculated as the ratio of discrepant informational units (i.e., informational 
differences and additional information) to the total number of informational units 
provided in the first interview. Results indicated that discrepancies were found for all 
participants, with a mean discrepancy level of .32. There were significantly more 
discrepancies involving peripheral details than central details, and individuals with high 
levels of posttraumatic stress symptoms showed an increase in discrepancy as the length 
of time between interviews increased. This time interval discrepancy increase was not 
significant for individuals with low levels of posttraumatic stress symptoms. Because 
deception motivation was presumed to be extremely low among study participants (i.e., 
all participants had been granted asylum affirmatively prior to participation), results 
indicate that discrepancies are pervasive even within truthful accounts of persecution.  
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The Present Study 
 Testimonial inconsistencies can be used as the basis for adverse credibility 
determinations and subsequent asylum claim denials. This practice likely stems, in part, 
from legitimate concerns regarding fabricated asylum applications and the fact that there 
is little empirical research available to guide judges in distinguishing meritorious claims 
from false applications. The work of Herlihy et al. (2002) suggests that genuine claims 
are likely to contain discrepancies, but to date no one has compared the levels/types of 
discrepancies in veracious accounts to those in fabricated claims. The present study 
aimed to add to the literature by determining what, if any, differences in testimonial 
inconsistencies exist between genuine and exaggerated asylum claims.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants included 30 asylees (18 males; 12 females) who volunteered to 
participate in a study regarding asylees, trauma, and memory. Two individuals had to be 
excluded from analyses due to failed manipulation checks, resulting in a sample size of 
28 individuals. Participant age ranged from 21 to 54 (M = 34.93; SD = 10.0). The majority 
of participants were recruited from service providers in Philadelphia who specialize in 
refugee and resettlement issues; however, chain-referral sampling was also utilized due to 
the limited participant pool and recruitment difficulties. To meet study eligibility 
requirements, participants needed to have been legally granted asylum in the United 
States with no pending legal proceedings regarding refugee/asylum status. In addition, 
participants required conversational English, or the ability to provide an adequate 
interpreter for the interview. Affirmative asylum applicants in the United States are 
13 
 
 
 
required to provide their own interpreters for asylum officer interviews, so this request 
was considered ecologically valid; however, only one participant needed a translator. 
Despite the relatively small sample size, participants self-reported diverse countries of 
origin including Cameroon (n=1; 3.6%), Pakistan (n=5; 17.9%), Liberia (n=1; 3.6%), 
Sudan (n=6; 21.4%), Colombia (n=1; 3.6%), Syria (n=1; 3.6%), Guinea (n=4; 14.3%), 
Angola (n=2; 7.1%), Burundi (n=1; 3.6%), Egypt (n=2; 7.1%), Eritrea (n=1; 3.6%), 
Mauritania (n=1; 3.6%), Ethiopia (n=1; 3.6%), and Uzbekistan (n=1; 3.6%). Twenty-nine 
of the participants were able to complete the study in English, but native languages 
within the sample included French, Urdu, Arabic, Spanish, Guinea Bissau Creole, 
Kunama, Soninke, Amharic, Russian, Punjabi, Susu, Portuguese, Swahili, and Uzbek. All 
participants were granted asylum in the United States between 1999 and 2013 and all 
received $30.00 compensation at the conclusion of the second interview.  
Measures 
 All participants completed a six-item demographic questionnaire at the beginning 
of the study session. See Appendix A for specific questions. 
Participants were screened for symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) using Brewin et al.’s (2002) Brief Trauma Screening Questionnaire (TSQ). This 
symptom–based, 10-item screening measure includes yes/no questions intended to gauge 
the presence of two major symptoms of PTSD (re-experience of trauma and 
hyperarousal). Respondents were asked to indicate whether they have experienced each 
item at least twice within the past week. Trauma re-experience items include “upsetting 
thoughts or memories about the event that have come into your mind against your will,” 
and “acting or feeling as though the event were happening again.”  Items measuring 
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hyperarousal include “heightened awareness of potential dangers to yourself and others,” 
and “irritability or outbursts of anger.”  The TSQ has been cross-validated and 
demonstrates excellent predictive utility for PTSD diagnoses, with a cut off of six or 
more endorsed symptoms achieving an efficiency rating of 90% (Brewin et al., 2002). 
See Appendix B for the full TSQ. 
 Participant interviews were conducted using Herlihy et al.’s (2002) Repeated 
Memory Tests for traumatic and non-traumatic events. This 15-item structured interview 
was developed for a previous study examining discrepancy prevalence among asylees 
and provides a method by which to standardize interviewing procedures and calculate a 
discrepancy rating. The traumatic event interview was prefaced with the following 
instructions: “Please tell me about a time before you came to the United States when you 
thought you or someone close to you was in danger of death. The event should be related 
to your application for asylum, although you can pick any single event that you are 
comfortable discussing.”  The non-traumatic event interview includes instructions to 
“Please tell me about another incident when you were happy (from as near to the same 
time period as possible).”  For both the traumatic and non-traumatic interviews, 
participants were asked to provide a brief summary of the incident (free recall), and then 
to respond to 15 interview questions regarding the event. Sample questions included: 
“what day was it?,” and “who was with you?”  Questions were identical on the traumatic 
and non-traumatic event interview, with the exception of question five, which either read 
“what made you most afraid?” (traumatic), or “what made you most happy?” (non-
traumatic). After each question, participants were asked whether they considered that 
aspect of the experience to be central (“very important”) or peripheral (“not very 
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important”) to the event. The subjective perception of details as either central or 
peripheral is relevant because the same question might prompt a response that is central 
to one participant’s experience but peripheral in another’s account. For example, Herlihy 
and Turner (2009) interviewed one man who perceived the clothes he was wearing during 
a traumatic experience (an aspect usually assumed to be peripheral) as central because a 
friend had lent him extra sweaters to help protect him during a violent beating. See 
Appendices C and D for the full interview measures. 
At the conclusion of the second interview session, participants in both groups 
were asked to answer the question “How distressing was the actual traumatic experience 
you discussed during the interview? Please rate the actual experience (not your discussion 
of it).”. The response options were 1 (not at all distressing), 2 (somewhat distressing), 3 
(moderately distressing), 4 (very distressing), and 5 (extremely distressing). Participants 
in the exaggerated group were asked to provide a rating for the question “How much of 
what you reported during the interview today was truthful information (i.e., reports of 
actual events as they occurred)?”  The response options were: 1 (almost entirely false), 2 
(mostly false), 3 (equally truthful and false), 4 (mostly truthful), and 5 (almost entirely 
truthful). Responses to this question served as a manipulation check, and two individuals 
in the exaggerated condition who endorsed a 5 (almost entirely truthful) were excluded 
from further analyses. Lastly, participants in the exaggerated condition were asked to 
identify ways in which they embellished the actual events during their interview. They 
were provided with six options and were instructed to endorse all that apply. Sample 
items included: “changed the identity of the person inflicting harm,” and “added severity 
to true events.”  The goal of this question was to gather data regarding the ways in which 
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individuals chose to exaggerate their claims when instructed to make an experience sound 
worse than it truly was. See Appendix E for the subjective distress and manipulation 
check questions. 
Procedure 
 All participants volunteered for the study with the understanding that it involved 
two interviews regarding their experiences of having been granted asylum in the United 
States and past occurrences of trauma. Recruitment flyers were placed within the offices 
of participating treatment providers, and interested individuals were given the telephone 
number and email of the primary researcher (see Appendix F for recruitment flyer). 
Flyers were also mailed to potential participants from one of the two service providers, 
and the lead researcher attended several workshops aimed at asylees to recruit individuals 
in person.  
Interested individuals were able to contact project personnel, and once eligibility 
was established the first interview was scheduled. Interviews were conducted at the 
researcher’s office (50%), via telephone (28.6%), or as a Skype call (21.4%). At the 
initiation of the interview, participants were asked to complete an informed consent form 
(including a reminder that they may discontinue participation at any time if they became 
too distressed during the interview) and a demographic questionnaire. Participants also 
completed the Trauma Screening Questionnaire (TSQ) prior to the first interview. 
 All participants were randomly assigned to either the genuine or exaggerated 
asylum claim conditions. Due to the concern that participants might be reluctant to 
exaggerate their stories as a result of perceived (but not realistic) potential legal 
consequences, participants in both conditions were reminded that the interviews are 
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confidential, for research purposes only, and had absolutely no bearing on their legal 
status within the United States. In the genuine condition, participants were instructed to 
think carefully and try to answer each question as accurately as possible. In the 
exaggerated condition, participants were asked to imagine that they must make the events 
sound more (traumatic) or less (non-traumatic) severe than they actually were to achieve 
an important goal. They were instructed to think of a real event, but then to exaggerate as 
much as they felt was warranted to make the experience seem more important/impactful 
than it actually was (i.e., “Imagine there is something you really want, but you can only 
get it if you convince me that this event was much more terrible than it actually was. Feel 
free to change as much of the real story as you want, but remember you are trying to 
make it sound more difficult than it actually was.”). The method of exaggerating an actual 
event (rather than fabricating an event completely) was chosen because it is likely that 
individuals applying for asylum have experienced difficulties in their country of origin, 
regardless of whether the experience meets the threshold of persecution. Therefore, it was 
considered more ecologically valid to examine exaggerated claims rather than entirely 
fictitious reports. Individuals in both conditions were reminded that they would be 
interviewed at a later date about the same events. 
All participants completed the traumatic event interview, followed by the non-
traumatic event interview. Counterbalancing was considered, but ultimately it was 
determined that discussing a happy event before the end of the testing session would 
serve a dual purpose of gathering data while simultaneously helping to alleviate any 
distress originating from the previous discussion of a traumatic event. Additional distress 
minimization measures included offers for interview breaks, discontinuation, and referral 
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to mental health services as appropriate. None of the study participants became 
substantially distressed or required mental health services during the interview sessions. 
At the conclusion of the non-traumatic event interview, participants were asked to 
schedule their second interview for approximately 2 weeks following the initial testing 
session. During the second testing session, participants completed the traumatic and non-
traumatic event interviews again, describing the same experiences discussed during the 
first session. All participants were reminded of the original instructions and asked to 
answer the questions in the same way they did during their original interviews. At the 
conclusion of the second interview session, participants answered questions regarding 
their subjective perception of the distress caused by the traumatic event, completed the 
manipulation check (exaggerated group only), and specified the ways in which they 
exaggerated during the interview (exaggerated group only).  
Design 
 This study utilized an experimental design whereby the primary independent 
variable was condition (genuine vs. exaggerated). A second, quasi-independent variable 
was PTSD symptom level. Individuals endorsing six or more items on the TSQ were 
considered to display high levels of PTSD symptoms, and those endorsing less than six 
were considered to present with low levels of PTSD symptoms.  
 The dependent variable was broadly conceptualized as informational 
discrepancies between interview one and interview two. Discrepancy levels were 
operationally defined as the number of discrepant units of information (including altered 
information, newly added information, and omitted information) divided by the total 
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number of informational units in the first interview. Separate discrepancy values were 
calculated for items reported to be central and peripheral to the experience.  
Hypotheses 
 As a result of the dearth of empirical literature in this area, analyses were largely 
exploratory. However, based on the current theoretical claims outlined above, several 
hypotheses were generated.  
 Genuine vs. Exaggerated claim differences. A primary goal of the present study 
was to determine whether the data supported the assumption of some immigration judges 
that testimonial inconsistencies are associated with exaggerated/feigned claims (i.e., 
whether exaggerated claims contain higher levels of inconsistent information than 
genuine claims). Second, the study aimed to examine whether particular types of 
inconsistencies (i.e., peripheral, central) are more prevalent in exaggerated vs. genuine 
claims. Previous research has demonstrated that memory for central details may be 
superior to memory for peripheral details within this population (e.g., Herlihy et al., 
2002). Therefore, it was predicted that individuals in the exaggerated condition would 
exhibit significantly higher proportions of total (central and peripheral) and central 
inconsistencies than those in the genuine condition. Differences in peripheral 
inconsistencies were also examined; however, given previous research on the high rates 
of peripheral inconsistencies within genuine claims (see Herlihy et al., 2002), no 
differences in peripheral inconsistency levels were expected.  
 High PTSD vs. low PTSD within genuine claims. Based on the results of 
Herlihy et al.’s (2002) study, it was predicted that within the genuine condition, 
individuals with high levels of PTSD symptoms (those who endorsed six or more items 
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on the TSQ) would exhibit higher average levels of inconsistencies than those with low 
levels of PTSD symptoms. 
 Additional exploratory analyses. Due to the dearth of empirical research in this 
area, several additional factors were examined on an exploratory basis. First, the 
relationship between the length of time (in years) since arrival in the United States (and 
the traumatic event) and discrepancy levels was examined. It was hypothesized that 
longer lengths of time would be associated with higher discrepancy levels. Second, the 
relationship between days between interviews and inconsistency levels was examined. It 
was predicted that greater time elapsed between interviews would be associated with 
increased levels of inconsistency.  
 Data Coding. All files were coded for discrepancies including altered 
information, newly added information, and omitted information by a trained coder who 
was blind to the study condition (genuine vs. exaggerated) of the file. A total number of 
discrepant informational units, number of discrepant units related to central details, and 
number of discrepant units related to peripheral units was calculated for each participant. 
From these, discrepancy ratings for total, central, and peripheral units of information 
were calculated by dividing the relevant number of discrepancies by the total number of 
relevant informational units provided during interview one. For example, the peripheral 
discrepancy rating was calculated by dividing the number of discrepant units of 
information for questions rated as peripheral by the total number of informational units in 
the peripheral aspects of the first interview. Informational units were operationally 
defined as the smallest independent unit of information. For example, a participant 
response to question 15 (“what happened immediately afterwards?”) of “I laid on the 
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floor for one hour, then walked to my mother’s house” would be considered to contain 
four informational units (action: laying on the floor; duration: 1 hour; mode of 
transportation: walking; destination: mother’s house). If the question response in the 
second interview was, “I laid on the floor for several hours and then took the train to my 
mother’s house,” two units would be considered discrepant (duration and mode of 
transportation).  
Results 
Two participants were excluded from the data analyses due to failed manipulation 
checks, so the following results include data from 28 participants (15 genuine; 13 
exaggerated). Scores on the Trauma Screening Questionnaire ranged from zero to nine, 
with a mean of 4.24 and standard deviation of 2.62. Nine participants met the TSQ cut-
off score (6 or more) that indicates a probable PTSD diagnosis. Participants’ self-reported 
levels of distress during the traumatic event in question clustered at the top of the five-
point scale, with only four participants endorsing less than the most severe level of 
distress during the event (M = 4.86; SD = .36).  
 Genuine vs. exaggerated claim differences. Independent samples t-tests were 
conducted to determine whether significant differences existed between the genuine and 
exaggerated groups for averages of total inconsistencies, central inconsistencies, and 
peripheral inconsistencies during the traumatic memory interview. Statistical assumptions 
were checked and met for this test, as well as for the other results presented in this section 
(unless otherwise noted). Levene’s test for equality of variances demonstrated that the 
variance between groups was not unequal; therefore the statistics presented in this section 
assume equal variance between groups. There was no significant difference in total 
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inconsistency levels between the genuine (M = .75; SD = .26) and exaggerated conditions 
(M = .70; SD = .20; t(26) = .62, p=.21). The magnitude of the difference between means 
was small (eta squared = .01). Similarly, no significant differences were found in central 
detail discrepancy levels between the genuine (M = .84; SD =.38) and exaggerated 
condition (M = .82; SD = .27); t(26) = .14, p=.89). The magnitude of the effect size was 
very small (eta squared = .0008). Lastly, no significant differences were detected in 
peripheral detail discrepancy levels between the genuine (M = .63; SD =.27) and 
exaggerated condition (M = .55; SD = .21); t(26) = .86, p=.40). The magnitude of the 
effect size was small (eta squared = .03). 
 Independent samples t-tests were also conducted to determine whether significant 
differences existed between the genuine and exaggerated groups for averages of total 
inconsistencies, central inconsistencies, and peripheral inconsistencies during the happy 
memory interview. There was no significant difference in total inconsistency levels 
between the genuine (M = .75; SD = .26) and exaggerated conditions (M = .85; SD = .34; 
t(26) = -.93, p=.21). The magnitude of the difference between means was small (eta 
squared = .03). Similarly, no significant differences were found in central detail 
discrepancy levels between the genuine (M = .77; SD =.32) and exaggerated condition (M 
= .83; SD = .40); t(26) = -.43, p=.67). The magnitude of the effect size was very small 
(eta squared = .007). Lastly, no significant differences were detected in peripheral detail 
discrepancy levels between the genuine (M = .69; SD =.52) and exaggerated condition (M 
= .80; SD = .50); t(26) = -.53, p=.60). The magnitude of the effect size was small (eta 
squared = .01). 
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Overall, the statistical tests outlined above indicated that there were no 
statistically significant differences in consistency levels between genuine and 
exaggerated accounts of traumatic events. Although “proving the null” (i.e., proving that 
there are no differences between groups) is statistically difficult, guidelines have been 
suggested to assist with equivalence testing among groups. Frick’s (1995) 
recommendations for null hypothesis testing include: (1) the null hypothesis must be 
plausible; (2) the results must be consistent with the null hypothesis; and (3) a “good 
effort” must have been made to find a statistically significant effect if one exists.  In the 
present study, the null hypothesis (i.e., there are no measurable differences in 
inconsistency levels between genuine and exaggerated accounts) is plausible, and the 
results were statistically consistent with this hypothesis. The “good effort” to detect a 
statistical difference included requiring a highly non-significant difference between 
groups (i.e., p > .20) and a “small” or “very small” effect size (i.e., eta squared at or 
below .03) to accept the null hypothesis. The data presented above met or far exceeded 
these criteria of equivalence testing indicating that meaningful differences between 
groups are unlikely to emerge even with an increased sample size.  
 
High PTSD vs. low PTSD. Independent samples t-tests were conducted to 
determine whether significant differences existed between individuals with high levels of 
PTSD symptoms (those endorsing six or more items on the TSQ) and individuals with 
low levels of PTSD symptoms for averages of total inconsistencies, central 
inconsistencies, and peripheral inconsistencies during the traumatic interview. No 
differences in total discrepancy levels were found between the high PTSD (n= 9) group 
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(M = .68; SD =.25) and low PTSD (n=19) condition (M = .75; SD = .23); t(26) = -.79, p 
=.44). The magnitude of the effect size was small (eta squared = .02). No differences in 
central discrepancy levels were found between the high PTSD group (M = .78; SD =.38) 
and low PTSD condition (M = .85; SD = .31); t(26) = -.56, p =.58). The magnitude of the 
effect size was small (eta squared = .01). Lastly, no differences in peripheral discrepancy 
levels were found between the high PTSD group (M = .53; SD =.22) and low PTSD 
group (M = .62; SD = .25); t(26) = -.90, p =.70). The magnitude of the effect size was 
small (eta squared = .03). Due to the unequal distribution of participants in the high and 
low PTSD group, a regression analysis was also conducted to determine whether level of 
reported PTSD symptomatology (TSQ scores) was associated with total levels of 
inconsistency during the trauma interview. No significant relationship was found (b= .00; 
SEb = .02, p = .99, R
2 < .01). 
Additional exploratory analyses. A correlational analysis was utilized to 
examine the relationship between years elapsed since arrival in the United States and 
total discrepancy levels during the traumatic interview. No significant association was 
found (r = -.17, p = .40). Because the days between participant interviews was not held 
constant due to scheduling difficulties (range = 12 to 37 days; M = 20.50; SD = 6.83); a 
regression analysis was conducted to determine whether days between interview one and 
interview two predicted total inconsistency levels. No significant relationship was 
detected (b= .01; SEb = .01, p = .24, R
2 = .05). 
Given the unexpectedly high levels of inconsistency found in this sample across 
participants (total inconsistencies: 73%; central inconsistencies: 83%; peripheral 
inconsistencies: 59%), data were recoded to determine the types of inconsistencies (e.g. 
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additions, omissions, changed responses) that accounted for these levels. Discrepancies 
were coded as “additions” when the response during the second interview added new 
information that was not provided during interview two. For example, an initial response 
to the question “what were you doing right before” of “I was walking,” followed by a 
second response of “I was walking and I saw two people who put me in a car” would be 
counted as an addition discrepancy. Added information accounted for approximately 15% 
of participant inconsistencies during the traumatic event interviews. Discrepancies were 
coded as “omissions” when information provided during the first interview was 
subsequently left out during the second interview. A first interview response to the 
question “what was the date” of “October 2003” followed by a second response of “2003 
– I don’t remember the month” would be considered an omission discrepancy. This type 
of discrepancy accounted for approximately 28% of the total discrepancy levels. 
Discrepancies were coded as “different information” when the answers provided during 
the first and second interview were qualitatively different. For example, a first response 
to the question “what were you wearing” of “slippers, red pants, and a t-shirt” followed 
by a second interview response of “School Uniform; a white top and blue pants” would 
be coded as a different answer discrepancy. These accounted for approximately 57% of 
the total discrepancies. 
Discussion  
Immigration Judges must continually form opinions about the credibility of 
asylum seekers, often with little guidance. As a result, adverse credibility determinations 
are often rendered based on testimonial inconsistencies in accordance with the 
assumption that dishonest testimony should inherently contain more discrepancies than 
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veracious testimony. The results of this study provide initial data related to discrepancy 
levels during repeated accounts of traumatic events for both genuine and exaggerated 
reports. One of the most striking findings was the overall level of inconsistency across 
participants. Recall that across participants in both the genuine and exaggerated 
conditions, the mean total inconsistency level was 73% – indicating that an average of 
73% of the details given in interview two were discrepant from those provided during 
interview one. This is substantially higher than previous researchers’ findings of 
discrepancy levels of approximately 32% (Herlihy et al., 2002), and indicates that 
repeated interviews related to traumatic events may lead to much higher rates of detail 
discrepancies than previously assumed. Given this unexpectedly high level of 
discrepancy, data across participants were re-coded to determine whether a phenomenon 
such as hypermnesia (recalling more detail due to repeated descriptions of an event) 
could have been responsible for the elevation. Surprisingly, the majority of inconsistency 
levels across participants were related to entirely discrepant information (57%) rather 
than to omissions (28%) or additions (15%).  
Another important finding was related to the lack of statistically significant 
differences between exaggerated and genuine claims across any of the examined 
variables. There were no statistical differences between conditions in total, central, or 
peripheral inconsistency levels during either the traumatic or happy memory interviews. 
Given the limited sample size, it is important to examine effect sizes in addition to 
statistical significance, all of which were considered to be small or extremely small 
indicating that even if statistically undetectable differences exist they are not likely to be 
of great clinical or real-world significance.  
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 These findings have a great deal of practical relevance in the context of 
credibility determinations and asylum adjudication because many adverse credibility 
determinations cite inconsistencies between interviews as evidence for poor credibility 
and subsequent asylum claim denial. In these cases, immigration judges are faced with 
incredibly weighty and life-changing decisions, as denied asylum seekers will likely be 
deported and returned to their countries of origin to face possible persecution. The results 
of the current study do not support the supposition that testimonial inconsistency levels 
are a reliable proxy for lie/exaggeration detection; thus it appears that the practice of 
denying asylum claims based on testimonial inconsistencies is highly problematic. Given 
the discretion that is currently afforded to Immigration Judges, individual judges could 
incorporate these results into the credibility decision-making processes with relative ease. 
On a broader policy level, the guidelines put forth in the REAL ID act may require 
revision if the results of this study are replicated and expanded by other researchers. The 
current language of the act includes a clause directing immigration court fact finders to 
make credibility determinations based (in part) on: 
the consistency between the applicant's or witness's written and oral 
statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and 
considering the circumstances under which the statements were made), the 
internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such 
statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the 
Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or 
falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, 
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim, or any 
other relevant factor. (INA § 208(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2006 & Supp. II 2009)). 
 
Here, the REAL ID Act explicitly lists several types of consistency (or inconsistency) as 
foundational to credibility determination. Presumably, this language was included based 
on the common assumption that dishonest individuals should have more difficulty telling 
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a consistent story relative to honest individuals. Although this is a logical hypothesis, the 
results of the current study coupled with previous work in this area (i.e., Herlihy et al., 
2002) suggest that both genuine and exaggerated accounts contain sizeable discrepancies. 
Not only were inconsistency levels high in both groups in this sample, but every type of 
inconsistency level (peripheral, central, total) failed to distinguish between genuine and 
exaggerated groups.  Therefore, it appears that current credibility determination 
guidelines are not supported or guided by empirical research, and adhering to these 
guidelines will likely result in an unacceptably high false-positive rate (i.e., categorizing 
genuine claims as non-credible) among asylum seekers. Policy revisions will likely be 
required to align credibility determination guidelines with empirical research related to 
testimonial inconsistency. 
The present study was an exploratory first look at the interrelated issues of 
testimonial inconsistency and credibility, and had several limitations including a small 
sample, examination of exaggerated claims only (as opposed to entirely fabricated or 
“coached” claims), relatively low levels of reported exaggeration, and limited diversity in 
the types of exaggerations reported. Individuals in the exaggerated condition were 
encouraged to change as many elements of the true story as desired, but when asked to 
rate the level of exaggeration from 1 (almost entirely false) to 5 (almost entirely truthful), 
two participants had to be excluded for endorsing “almost entirely true.” Of those 
included in the analyses, the majority of participants in the exaggerated condition (69%) 
selected a 4 (“mostly truthful”), 23% selected a 3 (“equally false and truthful), and 7.6% 
selected a 2 (“mostly false”). In addition, when asked to describe the ways in which they 
exaggerated responses to interview questions, the majority of participants (69.2%) 
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selected “added severity to true events.” Another 30.8% reported that they changed dates 
or times in their responses. No participants chose to change the identity of the perpetrator, 
identity of victim, his/her emotional reaction to the event, or the reason for the 
persecution. In reality, individuals who file false asylum claims likely fall within a 
broader continuum of level and types of exaggeration than the individuals in this sample 
reported. Future research should endeavor to address these limitations, possibly by 
assigning individuals to different levels of exaggeration (including entirely false and 
coached conditions) as well as to types of exaggeration (e.g. “reason for persecution” vs. 
“identity of perpetrator”).  
This is a relatively new area of study with a variety of additional opportunities for 
research. For example, there are many factors which should be examined in relation to 
testimonial inconsistency within this population including: interpreter use; interpreter 
characteristics (e.g. matched gender, matched culture, etc.); type of account (e.g. written 
affidavit vs. oral testimony); presence and severity of behavioral health symptoms; style 
of questioning (e.g. open-ended vs. forced choice); and a variety of culture-specific 
factors within participant ethnicity, country of origin, tribal affiliation etc.   
Despite its limitations, the present study is an important initial examination of the 
widespread assumption that testimonial inconsistencies are indicative of false or 
exaggerated asylum claims. The results require replication and elaboration by other 
researchers, but could have substantial implications for both informal and formalized 
judicial policy regarding immigration court decision making in the context of credibility 
determination and asylum adjudication. 
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Appendix A: Demographic Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. Age _____________years old 
 
2. Gender (Circle One) 
 
MALE        FEMALE 
 
3. What is your country of origin? 
 
 
4. In what year were you granted asylum in the United States of America? 
 
5. What is your primary language (what language do you use most often in your 
daily life)? 
 
6. Are you using a translator today? (Circle one) 
 
YES    NO  
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Appendix B: Trauma Screening Questionnaire (TSQ) 
 
 
Please consider the following reactions which sometimes occur after a traumatic event. 
This questionnaire is concerned with your personal reactions to the traumatic event which 
happened to you. Please indicate (Yes/No) whether or not you have experienced any of 
the following at least twice in the past week. 
 
1. Upsetting thoughts or memories about the event that have come into your mind 
against your will 
2. Upsetting dreams about the event  
3. Acting or feeling as though the event were happening again 
4. Feeling upset by reminders of the event  
5. Bodily reactions (such as fast heartbeat, stomach churning, sweatiness, dizziness) 
when reminded of the event 
6. Difficulty falling or staying asleep  
7. Irritability or outbursts of anger  
8. Difficulty concentrating  
9. Heightened awareness of potential dangers to yourself and others  
10. Being jumpy or being startled at something at something unexpected 
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Appendix C: Repeated Memory Test- Traumatic 
 
 
Participant Number :  
 
Interview Number :  
 
 
Traumatic Event 
 
Please tell me about a time before you came to the United States when you thought you 
or someone close to you was in danger of death. 
 
Free recall (notes) : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did this happen just on this occasion, or did something similar happen a number of 
times? 
 
37 
 
 
 
Detail Questions : 
 
1. where were you in the room, in relation to the door/what side of the street were 
you on  C/P 
 
 
2. which town was this in C/P 
 
3. why were you there on this occasion C/P 
 
4. what was the date C/P 
 
5. what one thing made you most afraid C/P 
 
 
6. what were you wearing C/P 
 
 
7. what day was it C/P 
 
8. who was with you C/P 
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9. was there anyone else around C/P 
 
 
10. what were they doing C/P 
 
 
11. what time of day was it C/P 
 
 
12. what happened immediately before C/P 
 
 
13. what was the weather that day C/P 
 
 
14. how were you feeling at the time it happened C/P 
 
 
15. what happened immediately afterwards C/P 
 
Reference : Herlihy, J. Scragg, P. & Turner, S. (2002). Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories: Implications for 
the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: repeated interviews study. British Medical Journal, 324, 324-327. 
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Appendix D: Repeated Memory Test- Non-Traumatic 
 
 
Participant Number :  
Interview Number :  
 
Non-Traumatic Event 
 
Please tell me about another incident when you were happy <from as near to the same 
time period as possible> 
 
Free recall (notes) : 
 
 
 
 
Did this happen just on this occasion, or did something similar happen a number of 
times? 
 
 
Detail Questions : 
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1. where were you in the room, in relation to the door/what side of the street were 
you on C/P 
 
 
2. which town was this in C/P 
 
 
3. why were you there on this occasion C/P 
 
 
4. what was the date C/P 
 
5. what one thing made you most happy C/P 
 
 
6. what were you wearing C/P 
 
 
7. what day was it C/P 
 
8. who was with you C/P 
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9. was there anyone else around C/P 
 
 
10. what were they doing C/P 
 
 
11. what time of day was it C/P 
 
12. what happened immediately before C/P 
 
 
 
13. what was the weather that day C/P 
 
 
14. how were you feeling at the time it happened C/P 
 
 
15. what happened immediately afterwards C/P 
 
 
Reference : Herlihy, J. Scragg, P. & Turner, S. (2002). Discrepancies in Autobiographical Memories: Implications for 
the Assessment of Asylum Seekers: repeated interviews study. British Medical Journal, 324, 324-327. 
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Appendix E 
Follow Up Questions 
 
 
 
 
1. How distressing was the actual traumatic experience you discussed during the interview?  
Please rate the actual experience (not your discussion of it). 
 
1 to  5 
Not at all distressing to  Extremely Distressing 
 
 
2. How much of what you reported during the interview today was truthful information (i.e., 
reports of actual events as they occurred)? 
 
1 to  5 
Almost entirely truthful to  Almost entirely false 
 
3. In what ways did you exaggerate the true events today (check all that apply) 
 Invented completely new events  
 Added severity to true events  
 Changed the identity of the person inflicting harm 
 Changed the identity of the victim(s) 
 
 Changed the reasons why events took place 
 
 Changed dates/times  
 
 Exaggerated my emotional response to the event   
 
 Other (please describe): 
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Appendix F: Recruitment Flyer
 
 
 
